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INTRODUCTION
The Barnes Foundation is a world-class art collection, amassed in
the first half of the twentieth century by the wealthy, but eccentric, Dr.
Albert C. Barnes. In establishing the Foundation, Barnes set forth de-
tailed and comprehensive restrictions on the use of, management of,
and access to the trust that funded it. Efforts to modify the trust in
the interest of public access have generated millions of dollars in liti-
gation expenses over the last fifty years. This Comment will explore
the most recent chapter in the Barnes Foundation saga: an offer by
the Pew Charitable Trust and the Lenfest Foundation to contribute
$150 million to the Barnes Foundation, contingent on the court's ap-
proval of major modifications to the Barnes indenture.' This offer re-
veals the considerable tension between the rubric of respect for donor
intent and the importance of the public interest in the administration
and modification of charitable trusts.
Charitable trusts receive significant public benefits in the form of
tax incentives, exemption from the usual rule against perpetuities,
and public enforcement of trust terms. In spite of scholarly argu-
ments for change, charitable trusts are almost always administered
and supervised under the principle that donor intent is paramount.
Public interest and notions of charitable efficiency are considered
only insofar as the donor himself would have considered them.
While the favored status of charitable trusts and deference to do-
nor intent have been longstanding features of charitable trust law,
closer scrutiny is justified. Philanthropy of the Barnes variety remains
a bastion of the wealthy for the wealthy. Charitable institutions allow
I See infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text (detailing these efforts to modify the
Foundation's bylaws).
2 See infra Part III (reviewing the public benefits that flow to charitable trusts).
(1747)
1748 UNIVII'ITY OI INNS YL VANIA LAWIEVIEW [Vol. 151:1747
wealthy individuals to exert control over their bequests-in life as trus-
tees and in death as donors whose wishes are legally enforceable."
Furthermore, the minimal requirements for qualification as a charita-
ble entity have led to a large number of charitable organizations that
serve elitist or esoteric purposes.' Given the benefits trusts receive, the
public welfare deserves greater consideration in charitable trust ad-
ministration.
Part I of this Comment provides further background on the his-
tory of the Barnes Foundation and the contours of the present con-
troversy. I will examine the status quo of charitable trust law and the
current dominance of donor intent in Part II. In Part III, I will discuss
three benefits that charitable trusts receive from the public, which to-
gether support the case for greater consideration of public interests in
trust administration. Finally, Part IV explores five options for how the
public interest can be considered in trust administration: (1) liberal-
izing the cy pres doctrine; (2) relaxing the fiduciary duty of obedience
and using greater discretion in public enforcement of charitable
trusts; (3) raising the bar to the creation of trusts; (4) lowering the ob-
stacles currently preventing trust failure; and (5) providing special
consideration for regulation of the care of and access to important
works of art and culture. While trust law varies state by state, this
Comment will use the recent Barnes litigation and Pennsylvania trust
law to demonstrate that the public interest should be considered
throtghout the life of a charitable trust.
3. See generally TERESA OIENDAHL, CHARItY BEGINS AT HOME: GENEROSIY AND
SEr.F-INTEREsT AMONG THE PHILANTHROPIC ELITE, at xi-xiii, 3-4 (1990) (criticizing the
elite nature of philanthropists, their charities, and their leadership).
4 Cf ALAN REYNOLDS, DEATH, TAXES AND THE INDEPENDENT SECTOR:
REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST AND FUTURE GROWrH OF PRIVATE CHARITIES AND
FOUNDATIONS 34 thl.3 (1997) (comparing contributions from foundations with those
from "other givers" and reporting that foundations' allocation to "human services" is
less than fifteen percent while their allocation to "public/society benefit" is less than
twelve percent of total giving); LESTER M. SALAMON, PARTNERS IN PUBLIC SERVICE:
GOVERNMENT-NONPROFIT RELATIONS IN THE MODERN WELFARE STATE 120-21 (1995)
(reporting that only twenty-seven percent of nonprofit human service agencies serve a
"poor" clientele).
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I. BACKGROUND OF THE BARNES FOUNDATION AND RECENT
CONTROVERSY
A. History of the Barnes Foundation
Albert C. Barnes was born into a family of modest means in the
lower-middle-class Kensington area of Philadelphia.' From these rela-
tively humble beginnings, Barnes went on to train as a doctor and
chemist, leading to his ultimate success in marketing the antiseptic
Argyrol. '" His pharmaceutical business earned Dr. Barnes an increas-
ing fortune.' This allowed him to take up residence in Merion, an
upper-class suburb of Philadelphia,8 and eventually enabled him to
accumulate his now-famous art collection.
Although he made every attempt to emulate the accoutrements of
his affluent neighbors in Merion, Dr. Barnes was a "self-made busi-
nessman," who felt his lack of polished "social graces" kept him on the
outskirts of high society. ' This social isolation, complemented by a
sincere fascination with art, motivated Dr. Barnes to collect art both as
a means to fit in and as a means to exclude those who spurned him.'
Between 1910 and 1930, Barnes studied and rapidly collected the art
that forms the collection of his now world-famous Barnes Founda-
tion," which was first incorporated in 1922 and opened formally in
1 9 2 5 .
-
2
5 IENRY HART, DR. BARNES OF MERION 31 (1963).
6 See HOWARD GREENFELD, THE DEVIL AND DR. BARNES 16-22 (1987) (describing
the discovery and development of Argyrol).
7 Chris Abbinante, Comment, Protecting "Donor Intent" in Chatitable Foundations:
Wayward Trusteeship and the Barnes Foundation, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 665, 666 (1997).
GREENFELD, supra note 6, at 27-28.
Id. at 28-29.
10 See id. at 41 (noting that it is unclear "[w]hether [Barnes] was motivated by a
genuine love of art, a desire to gain the power and social prestige his background and
behavior denied him, or a combination of the two").
11 See id. at 43-47, 67-71 (narrating Barnes's transformation from novice collector
to zealous art collector and educator).
12 The Barnes Foundation Charter (Nov. 1, 1922) [hereinafter Charter] (on file
with author); see GREENFELD, supra note 6, at 103 (describing the "formal opening of
the Barnes Foundation's new buildings" and its purpose as an educational institution
rather than a museum); HART, spra note 5, at 9 (reporting the opening of the Barnes
Foundation gallery and the creation of the Jounial of the Barnes Foundation). Note that
although the Barnes Foundation is technically a charitable corporation, this Comment
will follow the Pennsylvania courts' longstanding treatment of the Foundation as a
charitable trust.
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The Barnes Foundation was established for the purpose of pro-
moting the "advancement of education and the appreciation of the
fine arts."' Barnes used the Foundation to develop a unique educa-
tional and aesthetic program. His collection features great works of
the Impressionist, Post-Impressionist, and early Modernist periods, as
well as examples of decorative arts and African sculpture.'' The art is
hung in unique arrangements based on Barnes's theory of aesthetics,
rather than by the typical categories of artist or period.'
The Foundation was also meant to promote Barnes's belief in
democratic values by making special efforts to allow "plain people" to
access the collection while excluding activities and-during his life-
time-individuals that Barnes deemed part of the social elite."' The
Foundation's bylaws formalized both his aesthetic and social values by
setting forth detailed restrictions on the composition and placement
of the collection, the use of the buildings and grounds, the admission
policy, and the Foundation's management.1
7
In 1951, following Barnes's sudden death in a car accident,' the
bylaws' restrictive provisions became permanent rules which the trus-
tees-and the public-apparently had to follow.'' Less than six
months after his death, the stream of litigation challenging the Foun-
1" Charter, supra note 12, at art. 2; see also The Barnes Foundation Bylaws art. II (as
amended to Aug. 2002) [hereinafter Bylaws] (on file with author) (maintaining these
objectives in the current bylaws).
1.1 Edward J. Sozanski, WalLs of Treasure: What Makes the Barnes Intrinsically the Barnes
Is the Way the Art Is Hung. Any Relocation Must Consider That, PI-ILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 29,
2002, at H 1.
15 See id. (admiring the art's arrangement as part of the collection's unique aes-
thetics).
16 See GREENFELD, supra note 6, at 251-59 (discussing Barnes's erratic admission
policy, which sometimes excluded individuals based on personal disagreements and
social position); Bylaws, supra note 13, at art. IX, § 2, para. 30 (stipulating that access to
the gallery should be free for "plain people"-"men and women who gain their liveli-
hood by daily toil"); id. at art. IX, § 2, para. 32 (establishing the gallery as "an experi-
ment to determine how much practical good to the public of all classes and stations of
life [I may be accomplished"); id. at art. IX, § 2, para. 33 (forbidding social functions at
the Foundation because "[t]he purpose of this gift is democratic and educational in
the true Meaning of those words, and special privileges are forbidden").
17 See generally Bylaws, sup/a note 13, at art. IX (setting forth detailed restrictions
regarding the management of the trust, the placement of paintings, the Use of Foun-
dlation buildings and their hours of operation, the closure of the collection, the educa-
tional philosophy of the school, and a prohibition on the sale or tour of any artwork).
19 GREENFELD, supra note 6, at 285.
19 See Bylaws, suna note 13, at art. X ("[The indenture is] unamendable and shall
never be amended in any manner whatsoever.....).
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dation's bylaws began 2" and it has continued unrelentingly to the pre-
sent day.' Several of these cases have challenged trustee decisions,
claiming they were detrimental to the Foundation's purposes as
Barnes likely conceived them. Other suits have challenged the re-
strictions as damaging the public interest, given the Foundation's
status as a tax-exempt, charitable trust.2' As a result of this extensive
litigation history and the significant expense of maintaining an in-
creasingly valuable collection, the Barnes Foundation has sunk into
financial woes over the last ten years.2,1
B. The $150 Million Problem
With this brief historical sketch of the Foundation in mind, I turn
now to the most recent chapter in its history: a bold petition to
change the location, management, trusteeship, and access policies of
the Foundation in return for a multiinillion-dollar gift.2 5 Faced with a
dim financial picture, the Foundation's trustees were frustrated by
their inability to fundraise because of the limitations on public ac-
20 See Wiegand v. Barnes Found., 97 A.2d 81, 82 (Pa. 1953) (disputing the limita-
tion on public access to the gallery and claiming it was contrary to the Foundation's
charitable purposes as well as the public interest).
21 See Memorandum of Law in Support of the Barnes Foundaticn's Petition to
Amend Its Charter and Bylaws at 11-12, hi re Barnes Found., No. 58,788 (Pa. Ct. Com.
Pl. Montgomery County Orphans' Div. Sept. 24, 2002) [hereinafter Memorandum in
Support of Petition to Amend] (listing twenty-two separate lawsuits involving the
Foundation, many of which concern the bylaws' restrictions).
22 See, e.g., In. re Barnes Found., 672 A.2d 1364, 1367 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (chal-
lenging a trustee petition to extend off-site exhibition of selected artworks as against
Barnes's donor intent and a trust agreement provision prohibiting any loan of the art-
work).
23 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barnes Found., 159 A.2d 500, 505-06 (Pa. 196(0)
(fowcing the Barnes Foundation to open its gallery to the public as a condition of its
tax-exempt, charitable status).
24 See In re Barnes Found., 672 A.2d at 1369 (finding that the Foundation "lacks the
financial resources to pay for the renovations necessary to maintain the Foundation
facilities and collection"); Declaration of Kimberly Camp, Executive Director of the
Foundation at paras. 15-23, i re Barnes Found., No. 58,788 (Pa. Ct. Coin. Pl. Mont-
gomery County Orphans' Div. Sept. 3, 2002) (detailing how litigation and operating
expenses have left the Foundation with a predicted deficit of over two million dollars
per year).
25 See Petition of the Barnes Foundation to Amend Its Charter and Bylaws at 4-5, In
re Barnes Found., No. 58,788 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Montgomery County Orphans' Div.
Sept. 24, 2002) [hereinafter Petition] (explaining how the changes sought would
"solv[e] The Foundation's financial crisis and sectur[e] The Foundation's ability to
carry out its mission").
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cess, 2' the small size of the board, 7 the inability to deaccession works
from the collection , and the constant costs of litigation. As a result,
the trustees began seeking additional sources of funds that could pre-
vent the Foundation from falling into bankruptcy. ' '
Earlier this year, the Pew Charitable TrustO' and the Lenfest Foun-
dation' committed $80 million-and offered to help raise that figure
to $150 million-to save the Barnes Foundation . The Pew/Lenfest
offer, however, is conditioned on the Barnes Foundation making sig-
nificant modifications to the Foundation's restrictive bylaws. First, the
2 Both the bylaws and local zoning restrictions have kept the hours of operation
limited to only three days per week, with a maximum of fitur hundred visitors per day.
Memorandum in Support of Petition to Amend, supra note 21, at 20.
27 The board is limited in size to only five trustees, four of whom are nominated
and elected by Lincoln University. Bylaws, supra note 13, at art. V; id. at art. IX, § 2,
para. 17. According to some historians, Barnes began his relationship with Lincoln
University, a historically African American university in suburban Philadelphia, after
lecturing there in 1950 and amended his will shortly thereafter to give the university
control over the board of trustees. MARTIN MORSE WOOSTER, THE GREAT
PHI LANTH ROIISTS AND THE PROBLEM OF "DONOR INTENT" 46 (1994). The details of
Barnes's relationship with Lincoln University and the extent to which he would have
desired continued collaboration are currently disputed by the Foundation's trustees.
See Memorandum of the Barnes Foundation in Opposition to Petition of Lincoln Uni-
versity-of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education to Intervene Generally on
All Matters Raised by the Barnes Foundation's Petition to Amend Its Charter and By-
laws at 1-15, In re Barnes Found., No. 58,788 (Pa. Ct. Coin. Pl. Montgomery County
Orphans' Div. Nov. 18, 2002) (responding to the Foundation's claim that the proposed
changes to its bylaws would not "radically change" Lincoln University's role in the
Foundation, asserting that Dr. Barnes gave the university "some special role in the gov-
ernance of The Foundation").
28 No sale or loan of artwork is permitted under the bylaws. Bylaws, suna note 13,
at art. IX, § 2, paras. 9-10. A one-time exception was granted to allow the collection to
tour while the galleries were renovated in 1992. In re Barnes Found., 672 A.2d at 1370.
That tour temporarily alleviated, but did not solve, the Foundation's financial prob-
lems. Memorandum in Support of Petition to Amend, supra note 21, at 23-24.
29 Memorandum in Support of Petition to Amend, supra note 21, at 26. In a re-
cent article, Bernard C. Watson, president of the board of trustees, was quioted as say-
ing, "We have been walking a financial precipice for some time. Any rational person
could see we weren't going to make it." Susan Warner, On Whole, Barnes Collection
Would Rather Be in Philly, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2002, at Cl.
:io The Pew Charitable Trtust is a Philadelphia-based fotndation that supports a
wide range of' cultural, educational, 1nd public service programs. See About Us, Pew
Charitable Trusts, at http://pewtruss.com/al)out/index.cfi?image=img2 (last visited
May 4, 2003).
The Lenfest Foundation "Supports nonprofit organizations and programs in
southeastern and south central Plennsylvania, sotithern NewJersey and northern Dela-
ware." Welcome, l.enfest Found., at h ttp://lenfestfoundation.org (last visited May 4,
2003).
32 Memorandum in Support of Petition to Amend, slnra note 21, at 26.
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main collection must move from its current location in Merion to
downtown Philadelphia, :' :' near other museums and cultural attrac-
tions. Second, the restrictions on public access and social gatherings
at the new location must be lifted"' Third, the number of board
members must be increased from five to fifteen, with Lincoln Univer-
15
sity still nominating only four trustees. Finally, the bylaws will have to
be amendable by the board of trustees rather than through the cur-
rent court petition process.36
This offer and its conditions have set up a public and legal contro-
versy. The benefits of the offer to the public, the city, and the collec-
tion itself are potentially tremendous. The public would benefit from
increased access to the collection, which would be open many more
hours and in a location easily reached by both residents of Philadel-
phia and tourists. The collection would no longer be plagued by zon-
ing restrictions that severely limit the number of people who can view
the collection each week. The city would benefit by having this world-
class collection added to the downtown's already museum-laden Ben
Franklin Parkway area. And the artwork would benefit from a higher
level of art preservation, climate control, and security services than the
Foundation, with its current funding limitations, can presently pro-
vide. While some art aficionados worry that moving the collection will
diminish its unique character, 7 it seems clear that the public would
best be served by the court's approval of the Pew/Lenfest offer. :
43 Id. at 30.
34 See id. (summarizing the conditions of the Pew/Lenfest offer).
Id. Lincoln University has opposed the acceptance of the offer because of the
dilution of their control over the board of trustees and because it sees acceptance of
the offer as opposed to Barnes's intent. Pennsylvania: Opposition to Moving Art, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2002, at A22. The trustees are currently challenging whether Barnes
intended to leave the Foundation in Lincoln's control, arguing that he actually recon-
sidered his decision shortly hefore his death. Museumn Fights a College 'ie, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 2002, at A19.
46, Memorandtum in Support of Petition to Amend, supra note 21, at 36; see alho id.
at 31-37 (requesting these bylaw changes among others).
37 See, e.g., Sozanski, sulra note 14 ("The Barnes collection is spectacular because
it's unique in the way it's displayed .... [T] he total installation constitutes a work of
art in its own right.").
' Public support for the move has come from Philadelphia leaders, the two major
foundations (which pledged monetary support), and positive press coverage. See, e.g.,
Warner, supra note 29 (quoting the executive director of a local improvement organi-
zation as saying, "This would be a wonderful thing for Philadelphia"). Even Sozanski,
who so admires the unique aspects of the current location, admits tothe "rush of ex-
citement" when the petition was announced and finds tie change palatable given the
promises that the arrangements of art will be maintained. Sozanski, supra note 14.
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The public interest, however, is unlikely to be considered by the
Montgomery County Orphans' Court when it applies Pennsylvania law
to the trustees' petition.' The battle over the modification of the
trust bylaws will be based on the intent of Albert C. Barnes as the
court finds it. The relevant legal question is not what is best for the
public, but what Dr. Barnes would have done if he were alive today.
The importance of Barnes's wishes is in no degree lessened because
he has been dead for over fifty years. Charitable trusts and all of the
idiosyncratic provisions of their founders run in perpetuity. Notwith-
standing the potential for a meaningful public benefit, donor intent-
not public interest-remains paramount in the administration and
modification of charitable trusts.
II. CHARITABLE TRUST PURPOSES AND THE SUPREMACY OF
DONOR INTENT
The history and current status of charitable trust law is crucial to
understanding the Barnes dilemma and how the law currently pro-
tects donor intent. The codification of charitable trusts first began in
1601 with the Statute of Charitable Uses."" This long-enduring statute
is simply a taxonomy of possible trust purposes that could qualify as
charitable." The current Restatement of Trusts has a similar category-
based structure, although it further defines a charitable trust as
"property... devoted to purposes beneficial to the community. '42
Those beneficial purposes include relief of poverty, advancement of
education, advancement of religion, promotion of health, and gov-
ernmental or municipal purposes. Classification of a trust as chari-
table is based solely on an analysis of the written trust instrument.""
As early as 1934, the local government and school board chal-
lenged the tax-exempt status of the Barnes Foundation ' At that time,
:9 As the Barnes Foundation's executive director, Kimberly Camp, has recently
recognized, "[The petition] is not something that will be decided in the court of pub-
lic otinion. This is going to be up to the courts...." Warner, supra note 29.
() 43 Eliz., c. 4 (Eng.).
41 JOHN D. CoIOMho & MARK A. HAII., Tii CHARITABLE TAX-EXEMIhON 33-34
(1995).
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § I cmt. c (1959).
43 Id. § 368; see aLso 20 PA. CONS. SiAT. ANN. § 6101 (West 2002) (incorporating
the same definition of "charity" or "charitable" purposes in Pennsylvania as in the Re-
statement).
44 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 cmt. d (explaining that the motive
of the settlor in establishing the trust for charitable purposes is immaterial).
45 Barnes Found. v. Keely, 171 A. 267 (Pa. 1934).
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the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided that the Barnes Founda-
tion qualified as a charitable trust based on its mission to promote
"education and cultural development of young men and women.
The court granted charitable status notwithstanding the artistic nature
of the Foundation's educational goals, the limited hours for public
admission, and even the unrecognized theories taught within the in-
stitution's walls. 7 The Barnes Foundation's qualification as a charity is
a good example of the proposition that so long as a trust generally fits
within one of the six categories of charitable purposes, it "will be re-
garded as charitable unless its objective is wholly irrational .'.
These categories have been applied with varied,' but universally
minimal, requirements for the level of public purpose necessary to
qualify as a charitable trust. 5" Nevertheless, the benefits flowing to a
trust accrue so long as the trust meets the basic threshold of charitable
purposes, irrespective of the extent of charitableness. Thus, "[e]xactly
the same privileges and immunities are accorded in the creation of
the great foundations. .. as are accorded to a bequest to maintain a
hospital for ailing Siamese cats." '" The liberal rules for the creation of
charitable trusts, deference to donor intent,5 2 and a host of tax and le-
gal benefi ts'& demonstrate that charitable trusts are appropriately
deemed "favorites of the law.,''
46 Id. at 268.
,17 Id.; cf Commonwealth v. Barnes Found., 159 A.2d 500, 50-"4 (Pa. 1960) (criti-
cizing the Barnes Foundation's uncertain curriculum and number of students as well
as the trustees' decision to close the galleries to public access as inimical to the organi-
zation's purported charitable purposes). See generally GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT &
GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AN) TRUSTEES § 375 (2d ed. rev. 2002)
(stating that courts hesitate to invalidate educational trusts even if they "seek to propa-
gate eccentric ideas").
LEWIS M. SIMES, The Dead Hand Achieves Immortality: Gifts to Charity, in THiE
TiHOMAS M. COOLEY LECTURES 110, 121 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Series No. 6, 1955).
9Cf Mary Kay Lundwall, Inconsistency and Uncertainty in the Charitable l1mposes Doc-
trine, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1341, 1350-51 (1995) (observing that the Restatement itself
could not articulate a standard for excluding certain purposes that should not be
deemed charitable).
50 See id. at 1365 ("[T]he courts seem to be struggling with the concept of what
quantum of value to the community is necessary in order to validate it trust .... The
cases, while rather unclear, seem to suggest a very low standard.").
51 SIMES, so'pra note 48, at 118.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 59-73 (discussing the importance of donor
intent with respect to charitable trusts).
53 See infra Part Ill (detailing the benefits received by charitable trusts).
54 In re Estate of Pruner, 162 A.2d 626, 629 (Pa. 1960).
1755
1756 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW IEVIEW [Vol. 151:1747
Charitable trusts did not always benefit from such generous
treatment in American history. The American law of trusts was inher-
ited from British common law, and with it came the taint of British ar-
istocracy. In the early republic, many states adopted highly restrictive
laws regulating charitable trusts because they saw them as remnants of
colonial law. Until the late nineteenth century, "charity was associ-
ated with privilege, with the dead hand, with established churches,
with massive wealth in perpetuity" 51-with distinctly un-American ide-
als. Only the wealthy could afford to create enduring foundations;
thus, such entities were considered part and parcel of the problems of
inherited privilege.
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, American
attitudes toward charity began to change. Philanthropy came to be
seen as a substitute for government action and socialist values .
Greater reverence for private property and individualism led to in-
creased respect for donors and their wishes. The rise of the great phi-
lanthropists, particularly Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller,
created a new public perception that private wealth could be a "public
trust" benefiting all society, rather than simply a marker of elite privi-
lege .5 s These changes led to more favorable treatment of charitable
trusts and greater respect for philanthropists and their charitable de-
signs.
Since that time, the overriding aspect of the administration of
charitable trusts in modern American law has been deference to do-
nor intent. The baseline rule is that trustees may not deviate from the
explicit trust terms absent a showing of illegality, impossibility, or se-
vere impracticability through the cy pres doctrine.' In spite of wide-
ranging efforts by trustees and scholars to counter strict adherence to
donor intent,"" courts generally have allowed only narrow deviations
55 See HOWARD S. MILLER, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF AMERIcAN PHILANTHROPY
1776-1844, at 11-15, 2.-27 (1961) (relating the early rejection by many states, especially
Virginia and Maryland, of their British legal heritage, including trust law).
Lundwall, sura note 49, at 1346.
57 See WOOSTER, sl/na note 27, at 28-29 (conveying Andrew Carnegie's view that
private philanthropy was a valuable substittute for government welfare programs, which
he associated with socialism, communism, and anarchism).
58 Lundwall, supra note 49, at 1347-48.
59 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 381 (1959); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
6110 (West Supp. 2002); see a o infr-a Part IV.A (providing greater detail on the history
and uses ofcy pres in the United States).
See in/fa text accompanying notes 138-55 (disctIssing scholarly and legal chal-
lenges to the strict application ofcy pres).
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from trust terms and, even then, only after proof that those deviations
are truly necessary to fulfill the trust purposes.'3' To the extent that
the influence of donor intent has declined in the United States, it has
been at the behest of a handful of lenientjudges and jurisdictions, by
trustees in states without funding for sufficient oversight,'! or by do-
nors themselves who intentionally design trusts with greater discre-
tion. Unless they litigate for a cy pres deviation, trustees are charged
with fulfilling the purposes of the trust for the specific class of benefi-
ciaries and in the precise manner ordered by the donor.'5 Thus, gen-
eral public interest can be taken into consideration only insofar as the
terms of the trust allow. In a restrictively worded trust such as that
governing the Barnes Foundation, the trust terms leave little room for
the public interest beyond what is achieved by Barnes's specific direc-
tives.
Steadfast respect for donor intent has been justified by theories of
private property, freedom of testation, and society's moral and legal
obligation to the donor's largess."" The decision of In. re Girard's Estate
epitomizes judicial deference to the donor:
W For additional discussion of courts' narrow construction of deviations from do-
nor intent, see infra text accompanying notes 127-29.
62 Compare WOOSTER, supra note 27, at 13-60 (providing several examples of how
donors' wishes have been disregarded), with Abbinante, supra note 7, at 689-92 (exam-
ining some highly publicized examples of deviation from donor intent).
Scholars have noted that many of the offices of state attorneys general lack sill
ficient resources to litigate all trust matters. See, e.g., Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing
to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 37, 47-48 (1993) (noting that the offices
of state attorneys general "are traditionally understaffed, underfunded, and have many
pressing concerns aside from charities.").
64 See WOOSTER, supra note 27, at 10-11 (noting that the Rockefeller Foundation
provides a good example of a trust whose donor chose not to impose specific provi-
sions on the administration of his charitable foundations).
6r, See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 380 (1959) (explaining that a trustee
has "only such powers as ... are conferred upon him in specific words by the terms of
the trust, or . . . are necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of the trust and
are not forbidden by the terms of the trust"); id. § 381 (allowing deviation from trust
terms only if compliance is impossible or illegal, or if circumstances change in an un-
foreseeable manner). In comparison, see Pennsylvania's cy pres statute, 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6110 (West Supp. 2002), which is substantively similar to the Restate-
ment.
66 SeeAbbinante, sorra note 7, at 692-94 (stating that the argument for respecting
donor intent is that trustees have a moral and legal responsibility to the beneficiaries
of the trust and to respect the wishes of the testator); Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres
Reform, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1123-24 (1993) (arguing that donor intent has been re-
spected because of theories of property rights and pressure to honor social commit-
ments). See generally WOOSTER, supra note 27 (examining the issue of donor intent
through the history of the great philanthropists).
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Sulbject, of course, to compliance with all applicable laws, it is one of our
most fundamental legal principles that an individual has the right to dis-
pose of his own property by gift or will as he sees fit; indeed this right is
so much protected that a testator's directions will be enforced even
though contrary to the general views of society.... He is entitled to his
idiosyncrasies and even to his prejudices.
67
It has long been a tenet of charitable trust theory that the right to tes-
tation is a fundamental aspect of private property. Adam Smith
characterized respect for wills as "piety for the dead," a force he saw as
extending "property a little farther than a man's lifetime.'
Beyond theory and sentiment, there are more practical arguments
for respecting donor intent. In particular, there is a compelling ar-
gument that potential donors will keep wealth in private hands rather
than create charitable trusts if they believe their wishes will not be fol-
lowed strictly. Thus, the argument goes, it would be shortsighted pol-
icy to disparage donor intent because doing so would lead to less phi-
711lanthropy in the long run.
While this view may be true for certain donors, the donation cal-
culus is generally much more complicated. As this Comment will
demonstrate, given confiscatory estate tax rates and relatively harsh
regulation of private trusts, the alternatives to creating or donating to
charitable trusts might be distinctly less attractive.7' Scholars have
shown that tax incentives, absolute levels of wealth, "old money" cul-
tural norms, individual morality and altruism, and the desire for social
67 In re Girard's Estate, 127 A.2d 287, 290-91 (Pa. 1956); see aLso id. at 290-91 (up-
holding a racial restriction on a charitable trust that created Girard College as a school
for poor, white, orphan boys). The decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was
later overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court based on a finding that the racial restric-
tion was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because the board that operated
the school was a state agency. Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dirs. of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230,
231 (1957) (per curiam). Nevertheless, the importance of donor intent and private
property is still demonstrated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's willingness to up-
hold the restriction in the face of legal and public opposition.
68 Cf WOOSTER, supra note 27, at I ll ("In the 19th century, courts were reluctant
to apply cy pres because they wished to do as little as possible to disturb a donor's
wishes. Most 19th-century judges believed that an estate was private property, and that
property was something that must be preserved.").
.) ADAM SMIH, LECTURES ON JURISI'RUDENCE 466-67 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., Ox-
ford Univ. Press 1978) (1766), quoted in Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Quali-
lative 7'hemy ?f the Dead Had, 68 INn. L.J. 1, 14 (1992).
70 See Abbinante, supra note 7, at 698-700 (arguing that generosity is relative to
donors' control over their gifts).'
71 See infra Part III.A-B (arguing that special tax benefits and exceptions to the rule
against perpetuities provide donors with powerful incentives to give to charitable
trusts).
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power and prestige contribute significantly to the decisions of wealthy
Americans to create charitable trusts. ' The Barnes case itself suggests
a complex set of motivations for charitable bequests-among them
social prestige, revenge, democratic values, love of art, and the desire
that the Barnes Foundation run on its founder's terms in perpetuity.7 :
,7"
Somewhere between "altruism and egoism are the variegated
contours of donor incentives for large-scale gifts. Public policy and
legal norms should be shaped not by theories of donor motivation but
by an empirical and political analysis balancing the social and eco-
nomic benefits of protecting or loosening the protection for donor
intent. The question is whether public subsidies must flow to philan-
thropists for them to give at a socially optimal rate and, if so, how
much 5 The next Part articulates why respect for donor intent should
extend no further than the long-term benefits that it provides for the
public.
III. WHY THE PUBLIC INTEREST SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS
This Part explores three benefits that charitable trusts receive that
are critical to their growth and survival: tax exemption, an exception
to the rule against perpetuities, and public enforcement of trust provi-
sions. The public cost of providing these benefits is significant and of-
ten not offset by the increase in public welfare attributable to trusts.
While charitable trusts need only meet a nominal threshold for the
public good they provide, the public costs they create are highly vari-
able. The Barnes Foundation epitomizes that problem by providing
72 See F. EMERSON ANDREWS, ATTITUDES TOWARD GIVING 115-20 (1953) (pointing
to habit and emotional response as motivations for charitable contributions); ROBERT
D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY
122-27 (2000) (exploring the changes in Americans' charitable impulses in the twenti-
eth century and indicating that the decline in charitable giving coincided with social
disengagement). See generally ODENDAHL, supra note 3 (examining the multifaceted
reasons why philanthropists contribute to charity).
73 See supra Part L.A (providing greater detail on Barnes's life and motivations for
creating the Foundation).
74 See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 41, at 122-25 (engaging in the familiar debate
over whether the roots of donor motivation lie in altruism or egoism).
75 Id. at 122-23.
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the public with what is arguably the minimum benefit required for
76charitable status while engendering substantial public costs.
Beyond the economic balance, the advantages charitable trusts re-
ceive are predicated on the theory that charities provide important
public services. While it seems axiomatic that a charitable trust should
serve public purposes to an extent sufficient to justify its cost to the
public, under today's charitable trust law that is not always the case.
A. Tax Exemption
Charitable trusts, at the very least, owe a financial debt to the pub-
lic by virtue of their tax-exempt status. A charitable trust benefits
from tax-exempt status in two ways. First, the organization itself does
not incur tax liabilities on any income earned or on property or assets
17held . Second, income tax deductibility and estate tax benefits en-
courage donors to give money to an established charitable organiza-
tion or to found a new charitable trust. 8 Both types of benefit point
to important rationales for why the public interest should play an im-
portant role in the administration of charitable trusts.
First, it is important to understand how the law of charitable trusts
interacts with the law governing tax exemptions. Strictly speaking, the
meaning of "charitable" under both federal and state tax law is distinct
from the definition of "charitable" in trust law.7' In reality, however,
the American law of charitable trusts is intimately connected with the
statutory requirements for charitable tax exemption. In particular,
the definition of "charitable" under the federal rule-section
501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code-and under most state tax
76 See Commonwealth v. Barnes Found., 159 A.2d 500, 504-05 (Pa. 1960) (express-
ing skepticism about the public service the Barnes Foundation provides and requiring
at least some public access to allow the Foundation to maintain its tax-exempt status).
77 See I.R.C. § 501 (a), (c) (3), (d) (2002) (exempting charitable and religious insti-
tutions from federal income taxes); see also, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-
204(a) (3) (West 1995) (exempting the property of charitable organizations from all
local taxes in Pennsylvania).
See I.R.C. § 170 (allowing an income tax deduction for individual and corporate
donations to charitable organizations); id. § 642(c) (providing estate tax relief for do-
nations permanently dedicated to charitable purposes); id. § 2055(a)(2) (allowing a
deduction from the gross estate for bequests to qualified charitable organizations); see
also C. Eugene Steuerle & Martin A. Sullivan, Toward More Simple and Effective Giving:
Reforming the Tax Rules for Charitable Contributions and Charitable Organizations, 12 AM. j.
TAX PoL'Y 399, 403-04 (1995) (arguing that one purpose of the charitable tax deduc-
tion is to provide incentives for charitable giving).
7) For further discussion of the definition of "charitable" in trust law, see supra text
accompanying notes 40-44.
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laws is rooted in the law of charitable trusts."" The definitions of
"charitable" in tax and trust law have become so deeply intertwined as
to have created "a uniform concept of charity.""' Therefore, the same
minimal public benefit requirement for a trust applies in both the
trust and tax contexts, despite the great public cost associated with
82
granting an organization tax-exempt status.
While the number and types of nonprofit organizations benefiting
from federal and state tax exemptions are quite extensive, there are
extremely few charitable trusts that do not benefit from tax exemp-
83
tion. Charitable trusts typically qualify for tax exemption because
they meet the threshold for being "charitable" under the law of tax
and trust by fitting into a predetermined category of charitable en-
deavor.4 Even when they do not fall within these categories, charita-
ble trusts may qualify for tax-exempt status because they generally do
not operate for a profit8
s
The benefit of tax exemption also relieves part of the moral obli-
gation society may owe to the donor. A common argument for re-
specting donor intent over the public welfare is that donors do not
have to create trusts at all; they could opt instead to keep the assets-
in the Barnes case, the artwork-in private hands.s'  In reality, given
current confiscatory tax rates, the choice for many donors is between
philanthropy and taxes.87 The lack of realistic options that results
80 COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 41, at 33. Section 501 (c) (3) provides a tax ex-
emption for organizations "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charita-
ble, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes." This broad
definition is limited only in that the organization may not use net earnings to benefit
shareholders or private individuals and may not engage in certain lobbying or other
political activities withouttjeopardizing its tax-exempt status. I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3).
81 COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 41, at 180.
82 Although the other costs associated with granting an organization status as a
charitable trust are not insignificant, they pale in monetary terms in comparison with
the cost of tax exemption. Id. at 179-80.
83 See REYNOLDS, supra note 4, at 21 (noting that charities usually offer sufficient
external benefits to warrant tax exemption).
84 See I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3) (enumerating several types of organizations that may
benefit from tax-exempt status under the law, one of which is "charitable" organiza-
tions); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 (1959) (enumerating the categories
of charitable trust purposes).
85 See REYNOLDS, supra note 4, at 21 ("By definition charitable organizations devote
nearly all of their revenue to expenses and charitable purposes, so they would have no
surplus ('profit') to tax in any case.").
86 See, e.g., Abbinante, supra note 7, at 692-93 (explaining and critiquing the basic
moral argument, emanating from property rights, for respecting donor intent).
87 COMM'N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY & PUB. NEEDS, GIVING IN AMERICA 148
(1975) [hereinafter GIvINC; IN AMRICA].
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from tax exemption weakens this moral argument for strictly respect-
ing donor intent.
The moral case for donor intent is further weakened because the
benefits of tax deductions and estate tax relief flow disproportionately
to the wealthy, who alone can afford to donate enough annually and
at death to benefit from the tax breaks."" Thus, the choice to set up a
charitable trust is one that only the wealthiest Americans have the
privilege to make, and often it is not seen as a choice at all. s '
Tax exemption has provided significant economic and structural
benefits for the Barnes Foundation. In particular, Barnes would never
have been able to dictate that the collection stay intact without loan or
sale, or that it remain in its current building and location, if the estate
had been subject to taxes upon Barnes's death and the property an-
nually subject to local taxes. The current controversy would never
have occurred if the Barnes Foundation had not been tax-exempt and
therefore spared payment of potentially crushing estate and property
taxes. Given the current value of the Foundation's assets, estimated to
be as high as three billion dollars, c the Foundation's tax burden would
be enormous. The threat of losing the huge tax break afforded by
charitable trust status forced the Foundation to reopen its doors to
the public following the 1960 litigation brought by the Attorney Gen-
eral of Pennsylvania."' In that decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court made explicit the link between tax exemption and serving the
public welfare: "Every dollar a public institution saves in tax levy be-
comes an extra stone in the heavy sack the Commonwealth piles on
every taxpayer's back.' 2 As a result, for the Barnes Foundation to re-
Fewer than 0.2% of all decedents' estates accounted for 63% of charitable be-
quest deductions in 1975. Id.; see also ODENDAIL, sulnra note 3, at 61-64 (asserting that
U.S. charitable tax policy is not equitable because it provides the wealthy with both
greater tax breaks and the opportunity to exert greater influence through their philan-
thropic endeavors).
9 Cf GIVING IN AMERICA, supra note 87, at 148 ("[T]he choice for wealthy indi-
viduals is largely between leaving their property to charity or paying it to the govern-
ment as taxes .... ).
90 The estimated value of the collection has ranged widely from $300 million to $3
billion, while the cash endowment of the Foundation was approximately $10 million in
1994. WOOSTER, supra note 27, at 49. The Foundation owns the twenty-five-room
mansion that houses the collection and a collection of over 2000 works that include
highly valued works by Renoir, Cezanne, Picasso, and Matisse. Jeff Blumenthal, Barnes
Foundation Seeks OK to Move Art Callety, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 25, 2002, at 1.
91 Commonwealth v. Barnes Found., 159 A.2d 500 (Pa. 1960).
92 Id. at 504.
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tain its tax benefits, it must "unsheathe the canvases to the public." '
In the Barnes case, the court has already recognized that tax exemp-
tion creates an obligation to the public-which may override the will
of the trustees and even the donor-if the Foundation is to keep its
charitable status.
B. Exception to the Rule Against Perpetuities
Unlike private trusts, charitable trusts "may endure forever."!"
The endurance of charitable trusts is often characterized as an excep-
tion to the modern rule against perpetuities, which limits the duration
of private trusts. ) The exception can be defined more accurately as a
set of special rules that collectively allow charitable trusts to exist in
perpetuity. :"(
The public benefit provided by charitable donations is the pri-
mary justification for allowing the wishes of the donor to be enforced
long after death. In essence, "in exchange for... public benefit, [the
donor is] permitted to determine the future disposition of his prop-
erty without limitation as to time."" Once the purposes of the trust
are deemed to be charitable, the modes of administration and the
provisions of the donor, however eccentric, are to remain intact, lim-
ited only by the doctrine of cy pres, which allows for modification of
trusts in very limited instances.""
Allowing the trust terms to run in perpetuity produces several
public costs."" First, economic costs of dead-hand control include
93 Id. at 501.
91 ROBERTJ. LNNN, THE MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 21 (1966).
95 Id. at 9-10.
96 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 365 (1959) (allowing a charitable trust
to endure for an indefinite or unlimited time period); id. § 364 (providing that chari-
table trusts do not require a definite beneficiary); see also SIMES, sulpra note 48, at 113
(arguing that charitable trusts benefit from exceptions to tvo related rules: the rule
that a trust must have a definite beneficiary and the rule that trusts cannot be formed
such that they are never destructible).
97 SIMES, supra note 48, at 116.
98 See infra Part tV.A (discussing how the cy pres doctrine can act either to limit or
to extend donor intent).
99 Although the problem of dead-hand control has been explored in greater detail
elsewhere, see, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 66, at 1118 (finding cy pres to "be oriented too
much toward donors' wishes and too little toward the public's benefit"); Roger G. Sis-
son, Comment, Relaxing the Dead Hand's Grip: Charitable Efficiency and the Doctrine of Cy
Pres, 74 VA. L. REV. 635, 648-53 (1988) (analyzing how cy pres can be used to limit
dead-hand control as well as exploring some of the problems of the dead hand in
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limitations on alienability of property, limited marketability, and a de-
crease in productivity of trust assets and property. ' These costs are
evident in the Barnes case, where the endowed assets have lagged far
behind the market under Barnes's investment restrictions. "" Second,
time and changing conditions create a risk of obsolescence and
thereby detract from the charitable efficiency of the organization.
The theory of charitable efficiency looks to maximize public benefit
subject to donor-specified or other legal constraints.' 
02
For economic and charitable efficiency, the social costs are not
limited to the case of changed circumstances where "the dead hand
(and mind) has presumably lost its capacity to regret.""" Often, do-
nors specify inefficient purposes and ineffectual modes of administra-
tion at the time the trust is first established. For example, many as-
pects of the Barnes Foundation's economic and charitable
inefficiencies-stemming from restrictions on public access, tise of the
property, and maintenance of the collection-were already present or
fully foreseeable at the time of Barnes's death. In that case, the doc-
trines of cy pres and administrative deviation might be severely limited
in their ability to prevent the costs of dead-hand control.'0 '
Finally, the social and political wisdom of allowing the deceased to
continue to control the actions of the living simply by virtue of their
accumulated wealth should be carefully considered. Balanced against
the American principle of freedom of testation is the concern that
charitable trusts), this Comment addresses aspects of the dead hand as they apply to
charitable trusts.
I00 Hirsch & Wang, supra note 69, at 19-22. Hirsch and Wang explain: "When a
testator creates a use-restricted interest out of a trust ... society as a whole suffers from
the resulting sub-optinal use of resources." Id. at 22.
l0t After Barnes's death the bylaws limited investments to public instruments;
however, the 1996 litigation successfully convinced the court to expand investment
discretion to allowable investments under the Pennsylvania Probate and Fiduciaries
Code, 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7302 (1975). In re Barnes Found., 683 A.2d 894, 896-97
(Pa. Super. Ci. 1996).
102 In spite of academic efforts to quantify or delineate aspects of charitable effi-
ciency, it is inherently a subjective notion. See Atkinson, suna note 66, at 1136-38 (not-
ing the difficulty in defining public good).
Hirsch & Wang, supra note 69, at 26.
104 Both doctrines may allow modification to aspects of the trust based on imprac-
ticability resulting from changed conditions. Courts may be more hesitant to apply the
doctrines, however, when the donor knew of or could have foreseen those conditions.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 381 (1959) (stating that deviation from trust
terms is only allowed if compliance is impossible or illegal, or if circumstances change
in an Unforeseeable nanner); see also itJra text accompanying notes 126-28 (summariz-
ing the circumstances under which courts have applied cy pres to effect trust modifica-
tion).
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"the vanity of the dead capitalist may shape the use of property for-
ever. In the private arena, that balance is achieved, albeit awk-
wardly, by the application of the rule against perpetuities-limiting
the time under which the living must be subject to the demands of the
dead.'" ' Currently, charitable trusts have no such limitations. Thus,
the exception to the rule against perpetuities accrues long-term bene-
fits to the deceased donor whose demands, eccentricities, and prefer-
ences can extend long into the future. In return, the public should be
able to demand that the trust provide proportional benefits.
C. Public Enforcement of Charitable Trust Provisions
Only the state attorney general and, in some cases, parties with a
"special interest"' 107 have standing to sue to enforce the fiduciary duty
of charitable trustees in most states, including Pennsylvania." ' Stand-
ing does not extend to the next of kin,'" taxpayers,'"' the donor,"'' or,
I0. SIMES, supra note 48, at 11l. "It is this anomalous dichotomy, this manifesta-
tion of quasi-socialism on the one hand, and of the most extreme incidents of a regime
of private property on the other, which must be squarely faced in answering the prob-
lem of restraints on the charitable trust." 1I.
IN See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 69, at 49 (finding that the rule against perpettui-
ties "cut[s] short a futtre interest chain" and limits dead-hand control).
107 In order to qualiy, as having a "special interest," a party must typically demon-
strate that it is entitled to benefit from the trust and that such entitlement is differenti-
ated fiom the public at large. Robert Mahealani M. Seto & Lynne Marie Kohm, Of
Princesses, Charities, Trustees, ad Fairytales: A Lesson of the Simple Wishes of Princess Bernice
Pauahi Bishop, 21 HAW. L. REV. 393, 410 (1999). Courts have varied historically and
across jurisdictions on how widely they will grant special-interest standing. Some states
have more liberal standing rules that define interested parties more broadly than just
the specific class of beneficiaries. See, e.g., Alison Manolovici Cody, Success in New Jersey:
Using the Charitable Trust Doctrine to Preserve Women's Reproductive Services Wen Hospitals
Become Catholic, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 323, 351-54 (2000) (showing how standing
doctrine is liberally applied in NewJersey).
108 See Valley Forge Historical Soc'y v. Wash. Mem'l Chapel, 426 A.2d 1123, 1127
(Pa. 1981 ) ("An action for the enforcement of a charitable trust can be maintained by
the Attorney General, a member of the charitable organization or someone having a
special interest in the trust."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (limiting
standing for the enforcement of charitable trusts to the attorney general, cotrustees, or
indiv'iduals with "special interests"); Blasko et al., supra note 63, at 38 (noting that the
attorney general is generally responsible for enforcement of the fiduciary duties of
charitable trusts).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391.
110 See Wiegand v. Barnes Found., 97 A.2d 81, 82-83 (Pa. 1953) (opining that un-
der the common law, "no person whose interest is only that held in common with
other members of the public" has standing to enforce charitable trusts).
III See Kenneth L. Karst, The Ejficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State
Responsibility, 73 HARV. L. REV. 433, 446-47 (1960) ("[l]t is universally held that con-
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in many cases, the direct beneficiaries of the trust." 2 In the Barnes
case, lack of standing has prevented suits by a. taxpayer who was also
an editor for a local newspaper,'" as well as by former students of the
Foundation's art school, even though the students held limited posi-
tions on the board of trustees."14
/ The history and purposes of this standing doctrine make clear
that public enforcement is predicated on the paramount importance
of the public interest in the administration of charitable trusts. The
attorney general acts under the parens patriae power, which has its
roots in the "ancient powers of guardianship over persons under dis-
ability and of protectorship of the public interest."' ' This power, his-
torically held by the English king,"" has been adopted in the United
States by state and federal governments through common law and
state statutes.' 17 American courts have left supervision of charitable
trusts to the public precisely because the public is the ultimate benefi-
ciary of all charities, notwithstanding the specific nature of the be-
quest. 1  Some courts have indicated that the public's interest is so
strong that it becomes akin to a property interest in trust assets.'
tributors to public charities have no standing to enforce the duties of their fiduciar-
ies."). For a lore in-depth treatment of the problei of recognizing donors' standing,
see Rol) Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Ese) Should Enforce the Diuties of Charitable Fi-
ducimies?, 23J. CORP. L. 655, 664-69 (1998).
]I2 RESTrATEMIENT (SECOND) O FTRUSTS § 391 cmt. c ("The mere fact that a person
is a possible beneficiary is not sutficient to entitle him to maintain a suit for the en-
forcement of a charitable trust."). A limited exception to this rule can be made based
on promissory estoppel if a particular set of beneficiaries reasonably relied on the trust
terms and was particularly entitled to benefit. Atkinson, supra note 11, at 675.
"1 Wiegand, 97 A.2d at 82.
In re Barnes Found., 672 A.2d 1364, 1366 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
115 In re Estate of Pruner, 136 A.2d 107, 109 (Pa. 1957).
l11t I.
117 See, e.g., 20 PA. CONS. SrAT. ANN. § 6110 (West Stpp. 2002) (providing forjudi-
cial termination of trusts if they create public costs disproportionate to charitable
benefits); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (authorizing th& attorneys gen-
eral, among others, to enforce a charitable trust).
18 See Blasko et al., supra note 63, at 42-43 (justifying public enforcement of public
charities based on their public benefits, and suggesting protection against "vexatious
litigation" by outside plaintiffs and the next of kin, as well as maladministration by
their own trustees, is therefore warranted).
lit? See In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d 324, 330 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002)
("Property given to a charity is in a measure public property,. . and the beneficiary of
charitable trusts is the general public to whon the social and economic benefits of the
trusts accrue." (citing In re Prune; 136 A.2d at 109; In re Estate of McKee, 108 A.2d 214,
232 (Pa. 1954))).
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Enforcement of donor provisions furthers the general public wel-
fare insofar as it creates a donor-friendly environment, where donors
can be confident their wishes will continue to be enforced. By re-
specting their terms, the policy hopes to encourage donors to con-
tinue to dedicate their fortunes to public purposes. Public enforce-
ment also benefits the donor by ensuring that his particularized vision
of the trust will endure.
Public oversight of charitable trusts, however, is costly and strains
the otherwise limited resources of the state attorneys general. 12 In the
case of In re Estate of Coleman, for example, the court expressed con-
cern over the burden that enforcement of the donor's "personal vaga-
ries" places on the court system.12 1 The case dealt with a suit to en-
force trust terms that prevented non-Protestants or individuals
married to non-Protestants from serving as trustees.1 22 The court fo-
cused not on the discriminatory aspects of the trust provision, but on
the fact that there was not a sufficient nexus between that provision
and proper charitable objectives and on the undue burden that en-
forcement of the provision placed on the judicial process. '  ' The
court stated, " [T] his Court has never held that every notion of a [do-
nor] is entitled to judicial vindication.... [The provision] is plainly
insignificant in view of the Commonwealth's parens patriae power and
the court's ... supervisory responsibility."'' 2 The court balanced the
donor's intent against the public costs of enforcement of the specific
trust terms, colored by the social value of the provision at issue.
In the Barnes case, the costs of oversight and litigation have fallen
on both the Foundation and the public. A significant portion of the
Barnes Foundation's litigation history stems from efforts by the state
Attorney General, or by other parties claiming standing, to enforce or
alter terms of Barnes's indenture.'2 5 The current Pew/Lenfest offer
will utilize, at a minimum, the Montgomery County Orphan Court's
time as it considers the trustee's petition and the resources of the of-
121) Blasko et al., sulra note 63, at 4748.
12I 317 A.2d 631, 633 (Pa. 1974).
122 I. at 632.
1:1 Id. at 633-34.
121 Id. at 634-35.
125 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barnes Found., 159 A.2d 500, 501 (Pa. 1960) (de-
scribing the suit by the Attorney General against the Fotndation to force public ac-
cess); hi re Barnes Found., 683 A.2d 894, 897 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (noting that the
Attorney General was party to the stit but did not oppose changes to the trust docui-
ment); hi re Barnes Found., 672 A.2d 1364, 1370-71 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (reaffirming
judicial alteration of the tIust provisions over the objections of Friends of Barnes).
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fice of the state Attorney General to determine if the trustees' petition
strays too far from Barnes's original intent.
IV. WHEN AND How SHOULD THE LAw ACCOUNT FOR THE PUBLIC
WELFARE?
Having established that the public interest should be an integral
aspect of the administration of charitable trusts, the question is how.
The following Section explores how and when current trust law could
incorporate the public interest into the administration of charitable
trusts and how the law might be modified to better account for the
public interest. The problem becomes critical in cases like the recent
Barnes controversy, when donor intent seems to thwart, rather than
promote, the trust's ability to serve the public welfare. The remainder
of the Comment offers five ways that the public interest can be ad-
dressed while considering the Barnes Foundation's petition.
A. The Use of Cy Pres
Modification of a trust is typically governed by the cy pres doc-
trine. Cy pres allows for modification of a trust's express terms when
those terms are impossible or illegal, or when unforeseen changed
circumstances mean that the original terms now "defeat or substan-
tially impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust."""' Most
courts require that modification be truly necessary, interpreting "im-
possibility" or "impracticability" narrowly.12 7 Changes to trust terms
due to impracticability must be designed to approximate, as closely as
possible, the intention of the donor given the new circumstances.
28
Until recently, courts have rarely allowed cy pres deviations, and even
126 R•i.STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTrS § 381 (1959). In comparison, see Pennsyl-
vania's cy pres statute, 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6110 (West Supp. 2002), which is
substantively similar to the Restatement.
127 See, e.g., In re Barnes nound., 683 A.2d at 899 ("[The Foundation] fell woefully
short of satisfying its burden in demonstrating the vecessity for access of six days per
week, or the tenfold increase in the admission fee.").
128 See, e.g., 2(1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6110(a) (requiring that modifications be
made "in a manner as nearly as possible to fulfill the intention of the [donor]"). Note
that the translation of "cy pres" from French is "as near as," BLACK'S LAW DIc-rIONARY
392 (7th ed. 1999), further indicating how the doctrine is designed to remain as close
as possible to the original terms and intent.
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then have closely tailored them to the current terms or to the court's
findings of donor intentions.
2
1
Most states, although not Pennsylvania, ' also require that the
court find the donor exhibited general, as opposed to specific, chari-
table intent."' Cy pres will not be applied when the court finds that
the donor had only a specific charitable intent such that "the accom-
plishment of the particular purpose and only that purpose was desired
by the testator ... [and] he would presumably have preferred to have
the whole trust fail if the particular purpose is impossible of accom-
plishment."''3 2 Today this requirement is "more rhetorical than sub-
stantive" because courts almost never find that a donor did not exhibit
general charitable intent. ' " Nevertheless, the requirement does ex-
emplify continued deference to donor intent since a finding that the
donor desired a particular, now impossible or illegal, purpose could
lead the court to allow the trust to fail entirely rather than be modi-
fied contrary to the donor's wishes.'"
The hesitation of courts and legislators in the United States to ex-
pand cy pres stems from a history of its abuse by the English monar-
chy. The English system incorporated two forms of cy pres. Thejudi-
cial version of the doctrine was exercised by the English chancery
courts and required that donor intent be followed as closely as possi-
ble when the need for modification arose."" The other form of cy
129 Cf Frances Howell Rudko, Thfe Cy Pres Doctine in the United States: From Extrenme
Reluctance to Affinnative Action, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 471, 479 (1998) ("American courts
usually construed the [cy pres] doctrine strictly and narrowly....").
Pennsylvania eliminated the reqUir ement of general charitable intent in 1947.
See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § (i 10 official cmt. 1947 (declaring that for the purpose
of applying cy pres narrowly, the courts will no longer even give "lip service" to general
charitable intent).
Vanessa Laird, Phaintom Selves: The Search for a General Charitable Intent in the Ap-
plication (?f/the Cy Pres Doctrine, 40 STAN. L. REV. 973, 977 n.29 (1988); see also EDITH ..
Fisci, THE CY PRES DocTrRINE IN THE UNITED STATES 147 n.45 (1950) (considering
precedent for the general charitable intent requirement in the United States).
132 4A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTF & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE lAw Or
TRUsTs § 399 (4th ed. 1989).
133 Laird, supra note 131, at 977.
134 In charitable trust cases that challenge racially discriminatory terms, a inding
of specific intent to maintain the racially restrictive term could lead to trust failure
rather than trust modification under cy pres. See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 442-44
(1970) (upholding the Georgia Supreme Court's finding that Senator A.O. Bacon
would have wanted his trust supporting a white-only pbIlic park to fail rather than hav-
ing the racial restriction removed). Blt cf Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dirs. of City Trusts,
353 U.S. 230, 231 (1957) (allowing the use of cy pres to remove a white-only restriction
from the Girard trust).
135 Laird, supra note 13 1, at 974-75.
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pres was the "prerogative doctrine," which was a royal privilege that
allowed the king to ignore the intentions of the donor entirely and di-
rect the trust to causes of his choice."'" Strong aversion to cy pres in
the United States stemmed from association of the doctrine with royal
abuses of the prerogative power.137
Several high-profile cy pres cases have led scholars to advocate ex-
panded use of the doctrine as a way of incorporating consideration of
the public welfare into the administration of charitable trusts."," They
call for a departure from the "pure" model of cy pres, which adheres
as rigidly as possible to the donor's original intent, and for adoption
of one of several modified versions, each of which would allow some
consideration of public interest or charitable efficiency.'139
The Buck Foundation litigation highlights the potential for in-
congruous and inefficient results when a conservative approach to cy
pres is applied. Upon her death in 1975, Beryl H. Buck directed that
her estate be used for purposes that benefit the needy in Marin
County, California.4  Two unanticipated changes by the mid-1980s
made this directive seem inconsistent with Mrs. Buck's original inten-
tions: the assets of the trust ballooned from an original value of $9.1
million in 1975 to almost $400 million as a result of fortuitous busi-
ness deals and investments; and Matin County became one of the
richest areas of the country based on per capita income, leaving few
residents in true need of aid."'
Because of these changed circumstances, the trustees of the Buck
estate petitioned the court to modify the geographic scope of the trust
to benefit the entire San Francisco Bay area, rather than just Marin
116 Id.
137 See Rudko, supra note 129, at 482 (arguing that even Judicial cy pres was "sis-
pect" because of its historical associations with the British monarchy).
13 See, e.g, Atkinson, supra note 66, at 1114 (suggesting that "placing control of
charitable assets in the hands of the charities" will strike the appropriate balance be-
teen dead-hand control and public welfare); Wendy A. Lee, Note, Charitable Founda-
tions and the Argument for Efficiency: Balancing Donor Intent with Practicable Solutions
Through Expanded Use of Cy Pres, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 173, 187-92 (2000) (providing
case examples, including the Buck and Barnes Foundations, to demonstrate how cy
pres can be used to limit dead-hand control); Sisson, supra note 99, at 651-53 (arguing
that the cy pres doctrine should be applied to better address the need for charitable
efficiency).
139 See Atkinson, sup.ra note 66, at 1119-21 (reviewing and critiquing reformers'
suggested approaches).
IIW S.F. Found. v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1984); Sisson, sulpra note 99,
at 636.
1. Sisson, su.pra note 99, at 636-37.
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County."2 The trustees felt that such an expansion would more faith-
fully represent the trust purpose by serving a greater number of needy
people, while staying as close as possible to Beryl Buck's original terms
by limiting the expansion to the San Francisco Bay area.'" In spite of
clear changes in the socioeconomic makeup of the region and asym-
metry between trust assets and possible beneficiaries, five months of
litigation and a hostile court and state Attorney General led to an out-
of-court settlement that rejected the cy pres petition.'" Today, hun-
dreds of millions of dollars remain dedicated to helping the practi-
cally nonexistent needy in one of America's wealthiest suburbs.
Even in clear-cut cases like that concerning the Buck Foundation,
where changes to a trust would most certainly be in the public inter-
est, controversy over who decides to make the modifications and how
the modifications are implemented remains. How can the public wel-
fare be considered without simply substituting the court's judgment
for the donor's judgment, and thereby resurrecting the old, American
distrust of the prerogative form of cy pres? Rob Atkinson, in his influ-
ential article Reforming Cy Pres Reform, points to several proposed ways
that cy pres doctrine could incorporate notions of efficiency and pub-
lic interest. 45 One possibility that allows the courts to include an effi-
ciency calculus while avoiding the thorny problem of discerning sub-
jective donor intent is to apply the wishes of an objective, "reasonable"
donor. 4 1 Presumably, this reasonable donor would want to incorpo-
rate the public interest into any modification, rather than impose his
idiosyncratic preferences. Less radically, courts could create a pre-
sumption that donors would want to maximize public welfare in the
142 S.F. Found., 690 P.2d at 2.
143 See Lee, supra note 138, at 187-88 (arguing that the trustees sought a form of
"distributive justice," which the court rejected).
14 See In re Estate of Buck, No. 23259, at 752-53 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 15, 1986)
("There is not basis in law for the application of standards such as 'efficiency' or 'effec-
tiveness' to modify a trust .... ); Sisson, supra note 99, at 639 (discussing the results of
the Buck litigation).
145 Atkinson defines four possible ways to "apply the doctrine of cy pres in the ab-
sence of a clearly articulated standard of charitable efficiency": (1) allow courts to de-
cide; (2) apply a "we know it when we see it" standard; (3) address only those ineffi-
ciencies that are "out of all proportion" to the societal benefits gained; and (4) let the
trustees decide. Atkinson, supra note 66, at 1139-42. But cf Abbinante, supra note 7, at
694-98 (arguing that the test for efficiency is ani inherently subjective, Vllue-driven
analysis that the court is no better equipped than the donor to undertake).
4 SeeAtkinson, supra note 66, at 1119-20 (discussing the possibility of considering
what is "reasonable").
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absence of clear donor specification to the contrary.,17 As long as
these suggestions remain in the academic realm-without corre-
sponding legislative change-only a handful of courts will incorporate
the public welfare if the required changes are clearly contrary to do-
nor intent.
The Barnes Foundation's history of cy pres litigation demonstrates
the problem of balancing respect for donor intent with the public in-
terest and notions of charitable efficiency. In the early 1990s, the
Barnes Foundation already anticipated financial difficulties and peti-
tioned the court to change certain bylaw provisions to allow on-site
fundraising, increased public access, higher admission fees, and a one-
time world tour of the paintings.""' At that time, many of the re-
quested changes were not immediately necessary to keep the Founda-
tion afloat, making arguments for cy pres modification more difficult.
The court instead based its decision to allow a substantial portion
of the changes not on cy pres but on the administrative deviation doc-
trine. Administrative deviation allows the court to modify specific
provisions that control the trust administration when those provisions
frustrate the general intent or purposes of the donor."'' Unlike cy
pres, administrative deviation does not modify the underlying pur-
poses or beneficiaries of the trust and does not require a demonstra-
tion of illegality, impossibility, or complete impracticability.' " Never-
theless, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania proceeded with caution in
the administrative deviation sphere, stating, "It must be emphasized
that the relief afforded by deviation is not based on mere conven-
ience, but on the necessity of effecting a change .... ,,15' Neither ad-
147 See id. at 1120 ("A court faced with an obsolescent charity and the absence of
clear donor directions infers that the donor would have wanted to promote effi-
ciency .... ").
See In re Barnes Found., 683 A.2d 894, 896-97 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (discussing
the Barnes Foundation's request for permanent changes to the bylaws); In re Barnes
Found., 672 A.2d 1364, 1369-70 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (analyzing the 1994 decision to
allow the world tour).
149 See In re Barnes Found., 683 A.2d at 899 (noting that for a party "to succeed in its
request for relief it [is] necessary to show that a deviation from the terms of the inden-
ture [is] necessary"); Abbinante, supra note 7, at 683 ("Deviations from the administra-
tive terms of a trust may be excused when adherence to those terms would disrupt the
specific purposes of the trust.").
150 See Lee, supra note 138, at 185-86 (highlighting the differences between cy pres
and administrative deviation).
151 In re Barnes Found., 683 A.2d at 899. It should be noted that while the court
narrowly interpreted "necessity" in deciding the permanent deviations fiom the trust
terms, its separate decision concerning the one-time deviation to allow the tour inter-
preted necessity more broadly. In the case of the tour, the court based its decision on
2003] KEEPING CHARITY IN CHAR 1 TABIJ TRUST LAW
ministrative deviation nor cy pres leaves much room for consideration
of factors outside the trust documents and the donor's intent.
While the Buck litigation demonstrates that improving charitable
efficiency might not persuade a court to allow trust modifications, the
facts of the current Pew/Lenfest petition are more favorable for the
application of cy pres or administrative deviation than the Buck facts
or prior petitions relating to the Barnes Foundatioh. The dire finan-
cial picture for the Barnes Foundation makes change more immediate
and more necessary than in 1994 when the Foundation petitioned for
the tour and changes to admission pricing. ' 2 In addition, zoning limi-
tations have severely hampered the Barnes Foundation's ability to al-
low public access to the collection and may cause impracticability by
virtue of the collection's location. The current restrictions on the
number of visitors stem not from the bylaws or the courts but from the
township of Merion, which has repeatedly prevented the museum
from expanding its hours, allowing tour buses, or hosting certain
fundraising events.'5 The Foundation's attempts to challenge these
154zoning restrictions also have resulted in significant litigation costs.
In order for cy pres to result in acceptance of the petition, how-
ever, not only must the changes be based on true impracticability;
they also must approximate most nearly what Barnes would have
wanted. The standard under cy pres is still what the donor would have
done if he were faced with today's circumstances. Given Barnes's spe-
cific instructions that the paintings must remain in the exact location
that they were in at the time of his death, the strict regulation of ac-
cess, and Barnes's very clear wish that Lincoln University remain in
control of trustee nominations, it is difficult to imagine that Barnes
would have accepted the Pew/Lenfest offer. If cy pres requires ad-
the reasonableness of modifications in light of the conflicting purposes and interests at
stake, rather than strict necessity. See In re Barnes Found., 672 A.2d at 1367, 1370 (dis-
cussing the present and future interests at stake); cf Abbinante, sapra note 7, at 677-78
(arguing that the court was not strict enough in its interpretation of "necessity" in ap-
plying administrative deviation to the Barnes Fotndation).
2 The litigation surrounding the previous modifications to the trust is also a sig-
nificant factor in the current financial difficulties. See Memorandum in Support of Pe-
tition to Amend, supra note 21, at 21 ("In all, The Foundation has spent an astounding
$6.5 million in legal fees just in the past decade.").
153 See id. at 20 (citing a series of zoning-board and neighbor challenges to the mu-
seum's admission policy, such that "although public admission had been increased by
decisions of this Court, it was more severely restricted by Lower Merion zoning
authorities").
154 See id. at 17 (noting that the litigation has cost the Foundation "hundreds of
thousands in legal fees" to fight zoning board decisions).
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herence to Barnes's eccentricities as encapsulated within the four
corners of the indenture, public welfare might be difficult to ac-
commodate.
Administrative deviation also poses difficulties because the
changes required by the Pew/Lenfest offer seem to go beyond the
administration of the trust. Moving the entire collection to downtown
Philadelphia, rearranging the paintings, and changing the board
composition seem to alter the very purposes of the Foundation. 
'5 6
That said, in many ways the proposed deviations further, rather than
diminish, Barnes's democratic values. By removing the collection
from Merion, and placing it in a more central and urban location,
with extended hours and greater funding, the Foundation might be
better able to serve the "plain people." The decision will likely hinge
on whether the court finds true impracticability or whether it decides
that the changes are sufficiently administrative in nature to warrant
application of the administrative deviation doctrine.
The Barnes Foundation's situation demonstrates the problem un-
der current law of applying cy pres or administrative deviation in a
manner that truly accounts for the public welfare. Cy pres requires
true impracticability for its application, and even then maximization
of approximated donor intent takes the place of any consideration of
the public interest. While the threshold for applying administrative
deviation is slightly lower, it can only apply to changes that are admin-
istrative in nature. Strictly applied, the deviation doctrine does not
allow changes to more fundamental aspects of a trust. But even if
courts were to apply the doctrines more liberally, many problems
would remain, including the uncertainties surrounding who should
make decisions about changes, which criteria should be applied, and
what changes would best serve the public.
155 The construction of wills is typically limited to the "four corners of the instru-
ment." E.g., In re Stoler's Estate, 143 A. 121, 123 (Pa. 1928); cf In re Pruner's Estate,
162 A.2d 626, 629 (Pa. 1960) (interpreting the testator's intention from an examina-
tion of the entire will).
156 See Ahbinante, suna note 7, at 686-87 (criticizing the court for putting the 1992
changes under the category of administrative deviation and arguing they effected
changes to the purpose of the Foundation). But cf Memorandum in Support of Peti-
tion to Amend, supra note 21, at 61 (arguing that "[b]y avoiding a situation where
[the] primary purpose becomes incapable of fulfillment, the petition should make any
resort to the doctrine of cy pres unnecessary" b)ecause the court cannot conclude "that
any of the pr'ovisions as to which The Foundation seeks deviation are so fundamental
to The Foundation that they require application of the cy pres doctrine").
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B. Fiduciary Duty of Trustees and the Role of Public Oversight
The problems of the judicial role in trust modification indicate
that public interest should not be considered solely in the cy pres
analysis. Before trusts approach failure or impracticability, they are
managed by trustees. As is the case with the Barnes Foundation, those
trustees are typically chosen in a manner dictated by the donor.' An
alternative to cy pres is to afford greater discretion to those trustees to
both effectuate trust purposes and further the public interest by relax-
ing the fiduciary duty of obedience. 
1
5
The supervisory capacity of the attorney general extends to a trus-
tee's three fiduciary duties: the duty of loyalty, the duty of care, and
the duty of obedience." The duty of loyalty requires that trustees
administer a charitable trust solely for the beneficiaries and do not
use the trust to reap personal gain or engage in "self dealing."" ;" The
duty of care requires prudent management of trust assets." The con-
cern in trust modification cases, such as the one concerning the
Barnes Foundation's Pew/Lenfest petition, relates to the third cate-
gory-the duty of obedience to the donor's and trust's purposes. The
question is whether, and to what extent, public and judicial resources
should be used to enforce trust terms if deviation from those terms
does not harm, and may even aid, the beneficiaries or the public in
157 See Bylaws, supra note 13, at arts. IV, IX (specifying the exact board composi-
tion, term limits, and method of trustee election and appointment).
See Atkinson, supra note 66, at 1143-44 (discussing why trustees should be al-
lowed to exercise their judgment more freely in the administration of charitable
trusts). The duty of obedience refers to the obligation of trustees to strictly adhere to
trust terms and purposes. See Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD.
L. REV. 1400,1442-43 (1998) (outlining the duty of obedience).
159 See Atkinson, supra note 111, at 661 (describing the three fiduciary duties).
The duty of obedience can be incorporated into the duty of care or the duty of loyalty.
See Brody, supra note 158, at 1406 n.30 (declining to view the duty of obedience as a
separate fiduciary responsibility); Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation's
Governance and Self-Interested Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093,
1140 n.282 (2001) (noting that the duty of obedience may also be considered as an
aspect of the duty of loyalty). Because the duties of care and loyalty include a broader
set of responsibilities in addition to adherence to trust purposes and donor intent, this
Comment will maintain a distinction between the duties of care and obedience.
160 Jennifer L. White, Note, When It's OK to Sell the Monet: A Trustee-Fiduciaty-Duty
Framework for Analyzing the Deaccessioning of Art to Meet Museum Operating Expenses, 94
Micti. L. REV. 1041, 1052 (1996).
161 In Pennsylvania, the duty of care is governed by the Pennsylvania Probate and
Fiduciaries Code, 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7302 (1975). See ln re Barnes Found., 683 A.2d
894, 896 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (clarifying the relevant statutory scheme).
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the eyes of duly appointed trustees. This conflict arises particularly
when deviations disparage some aspect of the donor's wishes.
Several commentators have advocated for the relaxation of the fi-
duciary duty of obedience and a proportional decrease in public over-
sight as an alternative to the cy pres and administrative deviation doc-
trines." Reform could fall in a fairly wide spectrum with respect to
the status quo, but all would require the government to take a more
hands-off approach to enforcement of donor intent.
A near-complete repudiation of legally enforceable donor intent
would mean nearly unfettered trustee discretion. Trustees would be
free to make changes to the charitable trust's terms provided only that
the trust purposes remain within the broad bounds of charitability."I'
Trustees would still be subject to the same oversight under their duties
of loyalty and care, but they would have greater freedom to change
the purposes and modes of administration, even if such changes
would be contrary to clear donor intent. 114 In essence, the trustees
would act as the voice of the donor and the sole interpreters of donor
intent.
The intervention of the Attorney General to prevent the Barnes
Foundation from completely closing the Foundation's galleries to
public access is an example of how and when the government would
intervene. The Attorney General, and eventually the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, opposed the trustees' decision to close the Founda-
tion's collection to the public. The court found that the closure
would mean the Foundation could no longer qualify as a tax-exempt,
public charity."65 While the court noted that Barnes's intent was not
inconsistent with the reopening of the galleries,'" it is clear that its
162 See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 66, at 1115-16 (advocating increased trustee dis-
cretion as an alternative to either cy pres or strict adherence to donor intent); White,
supra note 160, at 1058-59 (applying trustee discretion in the context of deaccession
from museum collections).
163 See, e.g., Atkinson, sulra note 66, at 1143-44 (arguing that a grant of wide dis-
cretion to trustees would be limited by the requirement that they "operate within
whatever the state determined the bounds of charity to be").
164 Id. at 1143.
165 See Commonwealth v. Barnes Found., 159 A.2d 500, 503 (Pa. 1960) ("If the
Barnes art gallery is to be open only to a selected restricted few, it is not a public insti-
tution, and if it is not a ptblic institution, the Foundation is not entitled to tax exemp-
tion as a public charity.").
6 Id. at 502-03 (concluding that "the trustees of the Barnes Foundation may not
exclude the public from the art gallery without offering explanation as to why it ig-
nores the expressed intention of Dr. Barnes that the gallery shall ... be open to the
public").
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finding that the trustees had exceeded the bounds of charitability was
the driving force behind the court's decision to reopen the collection
to the public.
Notwithstanding the absence of legal enforcement, moral (rather
than legal) accountability and interest in securing future donations
would still provide incentives for trustees to continue to respect donor
intent. 1"7 Pressure -from the public, the media, or current contributors
can influence trustees not to deviate too far from reasonable donor
wishes. The Barnes Foundation's 1992 decision not to deaccession
over fifteen paintings was based partly on public outcry, serving as an
example of how extralegal forces can help to maintain aspects of do-
nor intent.'8 Without a court ruling or expensive litigation, the trus-
tees backed down from a decision that the public viewed as an inap-
propriate use of the Foundation's assets.''
Another option would be to include a duty to the public welfare as
an additional fiduciary responsibility for trustees. The process of dis-
cerning donor intent and balancing it against the public interest
would be shifted from the courts and the state to the trustees. The
courts could also intervene, however, to force trustees to actively con-
sider the public welfare in addition to considering explicit trust pur-
poses. This solution could still provide some level of public enforce-
ment for donor intent, but it would view donor intent through the
prism of public welfare and would consider the public as a separate
and legally protectable beneficiary of the trust.
The recent litigation regarding the Milton Hershey School Trust
is an example of when courts might intervene to enforce the public
interest.7 The Hersheys created the trust in 1909 to benefit orphan
children through establishment of the Milton Hershey School. The
school is funded by controlling shares in the Hershey Food Company
167 See Atkinson, supra note 66, at 1125-28 ("Donors... have long used informal
means to constrain charities.").
IM See id. at 1129 (describing the deaccession incident);Jason R. Goldstein, Note,
Deaccession: Not Such a Dirty Word, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 239-42 (noting
that members of the Foundation's advisory board were particulalhy opposed to the
deaccession).
169 See Atkinson, supra note 66, at 1129 (suggesting the trustees withdrew due to
extralegal pressure).
170 See In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d 324, 330 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002)
(stating that the Attorney General has "responsibility for public supervision of charita-
ble trusts," which gives the Attorney General the authority to inquire "whether an ex-
ercise of a trustee's power, even if authorized under the trust instrument, is inimical to
public interest").
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(formerly called the Hershey Chocolate Company).17 The trustees
recently proposed to sell the trust's interest in the Hershey Food
Company for the purpose of portfolio diversification. 72 The court,
however, found that the unique, "symbiotic relationship" between the
school, the Hershey Food Company, and the community of Derry
Township, where both entities are located, made the sale against the
public interest and granted an injunction, staying the sale of the
stock."' While the Restatement of Trusts indicates that trustees owe a
duty only to direct beneficiaries of a trust,'71 the court emphasized that
trustees have the additional responsibility to "see that the public in-
terest is not harmed by an act of a trustee that may otherwise be lawful
and purports to be in furtherance of the trust.',15 In addition, the
court asserted that while the Attorney General is charged with enforc-
ing donor intent, he must also ensure that the intent is compatible
with the interests of the public. 17v
The sentiments of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court may
have been wholly aspirational under Pennsylvania law as it stood, 77 yet
prescient as to a new standard set forth in recent Pennsylvania legisla-
tion. On November 7, 2002, the Pennsylvania legislature adopted a
bill that amends the "prudent investor rule" by requiring trustees to
consider the impact of investment and management decisions on the
community.' 7" The bill does not explicitly address how courts should
treat cases where community or public interest runs counter to donor
specifications, and is also limited to investment and management de-
171 Id. at 328-29.
172 Id. at 329.
173 Id. at 331-32.
17.1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) cmt. p (1959), cited in In re Milton
Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d at 334.
175 In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d at 334.
176 See id. (noting the duty of the Attorney General to ensure "compatability" be-
tween donor and public interests).
177 The dissent argued that "[a]bsent a showing that the Trustee's actions are
against the terms of the Trust or that the Trust provisions themselves are against public
interest, the parens patriae powers of the Attorney General do not apply." Id. at 338
(Pellegrini, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, the Attorney General may not
exercise parens patriae powers to further "non-trust goal[s]" to benefit the public at
large; rather, those powers are limited to ensuring that the trust does not act illegally.
Id. at 338 n.3.
179 See Act of Nov. 6, 2002, 2002 Pa. Legis. Serv. 133 (West) (amending 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7302 (West 1975)) (adding impact on the community to a list of
other reqtuired considerations relating to the financial position of the trust, the impact
on beneficiaries, and the nature of the trust itself).
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cisions. It is nevertheless a significant step toward greater considera-
tion of public welfare in all trustee decisions.
A final option would be for attorneys general to use their discre-
tion in challenging trustee actions. Since only the attorney general
and narrow classes of interested parties have standing,"7 9 discretionary
enforcement based on public welfare analysis could have the effect of
loosening the fiduciary duty of obedience. It is well established in
most jurisdictions that a decision by the attorney general to pursue
litigation in the administration of charitable trusts is, in fact, a matter
of discretion.""' Because of the limited enforcement budget, this dis-
cretion currently is used as a matter of fiscal exigency to prosecute
only the most "egregious of abuses."' "' As a matter of principle or pol-
icy, the state could oppose trustee modifications only when donor in-
tent, read broadly, has been so violated as to be detrimental to the
public interest. While duties of loyalty and care should surely be
monitored stringently, strategic, but less rigorous, public enforcement
and oversight of trustees' duty of obedience will arguably result in im-
proved, rather than diminished, charitable efficiency.
As applied to the current Barnes dilemma, either form would al-
low the trustees enough flexibility to accept the Pew/Lenfest offer. As
the current voice of Albert C. Barnes, the trustees have determined
that the offer is best for the trust, its valuable collection, the current
beneficiaries, and the public at large. The benefits of the move, in
their view, outweigh the detriment to Barnes's wishes. The court and
the Attorney General, under a relaxed duty of obedience, could allow
the private decision of the trustees to stand, without expensive litiga-
tion, absent a finding that the decision would violate the public trust.
C. Raise the Bar for Creation of Charitable Trusts
In many cases, the public interest is not adequately accounted for
in the formation of charitable trusts. As was discussed in Part II, the
standards for qualifying as a trust are neither adequately specific nor
sufficiently stringent to guarantee that the trust provides benefits in
17) See supra text accompanying notes 107-14 (summarizing the origins and scope
of the standing doctrine pertaining to oversight of charitable trusts).
See Karst, supra note 11l, at 450-51 (describing the decision of the attorney
general to litigate to enforce charitable trusts as "discretionary," not "ministerial").
181 Blasko et al., supra note 63, at 39. Commentators have noted that lack of fund-
ing and staffing in the offices of attorneys general nationwide cause rampant underen-
forcement of charitable obligations. See, e.g., id. at 47-48 (lamenting the disadvantages
of attorney general enforcement).
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proportion to the societal costs it entails. This fact is particularly true
in the area of educational trusts, such as the Barnes Foundation,
where no objective measure of educational value is required so long as
the trust's mission is deemed to be of any "social value" "
Given the laxity in the common law, many states have sought to
standardize the criteria for tax-exempt status. The Pennsylvania legis-
lature, for example, has already made admirable strides in this direc-
tion by increasing the stringency and clarity of qualification require-
ments for general tax-exempt status as a "purely public charity."'
8 3
The legislative intent is to ensure clear and uniform standards to pre-
vent taxpayer dollars from flowing to unnecessary litigation over chari-
table status and to ensure only worthy institutions enjoy this benefit.""'
Pennsylvania's statute, the Institutions of Purely Public Charity Act
(IPPCA),' 15' sets forth standards for the percentage of services that
must be provided for free or on a subsidized basis.'88  The IPPCA also
requires the entity to diminish the government's burden by providing
services that fall into one of several specifically defined categories. 1
7
While some states have made efforts to standardize and narrow
charitable tax exemptions, many other states and the federal govern-
ment have not. Establishing a higher and more uniform standard for
the creation of charitable trusts would ensure that, at least at the out-
set, the trust in fact serves a worthwhile public purpose proportional
to the benefits it receives from tax exemptions, the exception to the
rule against perpetuities, and public enforcement of donor intent. If
circumstances later change such that the original purpose is no longer
182 See Lundwall, supra note 46, at 1365 ("Courts will validate educational trusts
even when the value is doubtful so long as it is not impractical.... futile .... or so of-
fensive as to have no social vlue.").
183 Institutions of Purely Public Charity Act (IPPCA), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 371-
385 (West 1998); see also Nina J. Crimns, Why All Is Not Quiet on the "Home Front" for
Charitable Organizations, 29 N.M. L. REV. 1, 18-20 (1999) (using the IPPCA as an exam-
pie of states' interest in tightening the availability of tax exemptions for nonprofit or-
ganizations).
181 See 10 PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 10, § 372 (describing the legislative intent behind the
IPPCA); see also Crimn, supra note 183, at 20 (noting that statutes like the IPPCA were
intended to decrease abuse, reduce tax revenue losses, and improve the social value of
nonprofit purposes).
10 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 371-385.
/d. § 375 (d) (1); see also Crimm, sup/ra note 183, at 19 (finding that the IPPCA
requires organizations to engage in an increased number of gratuitous services that
benefit certain subsets of the community).
187 Examples of such categories include substituting services the government
would otherwise provide, making agreements with local governments, or reducing de-
pendence on government programs. 10 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 375(f).
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sufficiently beneficial to the public welfare, then the doctrine of cy
pres and the exercise of trustee discretion can make the necessary
modifications.
D. Allow Failure of Trusts
In limited circumstances, the public interest could best be served
by allowing a trust to fail. Trusts may fail for a variety of reasons, in-
cluding lack of sufficient funding, repudiation of the gift by the do-
nee, accomplishment of the specified purpose, or illegality of the trust
purpose. 8 Directly after its failure, the trust would be disposed of ac-
cording to the donor's wishes. Failure releases the assets either back
to private hands, to another charitable purpose indicated by the do-
nor, or to a purpose decided upon by the court if the donor did not
specify what to do in the event of trust failure. Once the assets have
been disposed of, however, the private parties, the new charitable in-
stitution, or the court are free of dead-hand control and may do with
the funding as they see fit, or as it accords with public welfare.
The doctrine of cy pres limits the likelihood that impracticability,
impossibility, or illegality of specified purposes will lead to failure of
the trust because cy pres allows the trust purposes to be modified." '
Although in some cases cy pres has been used as a vehicle to under-
mine donor intent, typically and traditionally it is used to perpetuate
the original intent. Under most cy pres laws, modifications must ap-
proximate what the donor would have wanted if he had anticipated
the failure of the purposes of the trust.' " Once the modification is
made, the remainder of the donor's provisions stays intact.' 2 While cy
pres has been used by certain courts as a way to circumvent donor in-
188 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmts. j-n (1959) (listing possible
reasons for trust failure); EDrii L. Fiscii, THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED
STATES § 6.02 (1950) (same).
189 See supra Part IV.A (defining and discussing the doctrine of cy pres).
IW See Abbinante, supra note 7, at 689-92 (pointing to situations in which founda-
tions deviated from strict adherence to donor intent).
191 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (permitting application of
the doctrine of cy pres, rather than allowing trust failure, if the donor had general
charitable intentions). But cf 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6110(a) (West Supp. 2002)
(permitting distribution of the estate for a charitable purpose when it becomes impos-
sible to fulfill the original purpose, whether the donor's charitable intent was general
or specific).
192 See, e.g., In re Barnes Found., 683 A.2d 894, 897 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (altering
only the provisions that had become impracticable and leaving the remainder of the
bylaws intact).
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tent in favor of public welfare, the application of the doctrine usually
results in only incremental changes"'3"
Respect for donor intent is only one reason for favoring cy pres
over trust failure. The main rationale is to preserve the assets for
some charitable purpose while limiting the rights of the next of kin to
sue. Courts and lawmakers have expressed numerous concerns about
allowing litigation brought by the next of kin to bring about trust fail-
ure."" First, heirs have a monetary stake in the trust failure. If the
donor included a reversionary clause, the trust assets often go to the
next of kin. As a result, heirs generally are seen as self-interested ac-
tors unable to adequately represent the public interest. Second, the
litigation wastes charitable resources on legal fees.'1' This problem
largely has been addressed by restricting standing to the attorney gen-
eral and interested parties, while limiting the rights of heirs to sue for
failure."9
One of the most important objections to trust failure is that trust
assets will transfer from charitable to private purposes. By making it
difficult for charitable trusts to fail, the law has indicated a public pol-
icy preference for keeping assets in the charitable, as opposed to pri-
vate or governmental, sector.' 7 This objection holds a great deal of
weight in cases where the assets would, in fact, revert to private hands
if the trust were to fail. There are many cases, however, where the
trust could be transferred to a different, often less restrictive, charita-
ble entity upon failure."9
8
193 See supna text accompanying notes 126-34, 155-56 (discussing the limitations of
the cy pres doctrine to make significant departures fiom original trust terms or donor
intent).
94 See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6110 official clnt. 1947 (removing the general
charitable intent requirement for cy pres because "[t] he conveyor's heirs, next of kin
and residuary beneficiaries will no lnger be in a position to bargain with expectant
charities").
195 See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Petition to Amend, supra note 21, at 21
(highlighting the millions of dollars in legal fees that the Barnes Foundation has ex-
pended on challenges to trustee decisions).
196 See supra Part I1.C (offering more detail on standing to enforce charitable trust
terms).
[97 See FiscH, supra note 188, at 158, 162-63 (demonstrating the use of cy pres to
sustain charities, rather than allowing them to revert to private hands, because of the
social benefits that charitable trusts provide).
1' Pennsylvania has already moved in this direction by allowing a court to termi-
nate a trust if the burden of administering the trust is "unreasonably out of proportion
to the charitable benefits." 20 PA. CONS. SI'AT. ANN. § 6110(c). Once the trust is ter-
minated, the court can award the remaining assets to a charity specified by the donor
or, in the alternative, to a charity specified by the court. Id. This provision is limited
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For example, if the Barnes Foundation were to fail, the remaining
assets would not revert to the next of kin but rather would be trans-
ferred to a purpose which approximates Barnes's intent "in connec-
tion with an existing and organized institution then in being and
functioning in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, or its suburbs.' ' "" This sug-
gests that were the court to allow the Barnes Foundation to fail en-
tirely, it would be administered by another charitable institution in
Philadelphia, free from the indenture restrictions. At that point, the
new management would likely be free to accept the terms of the
Pew/Lenfest offer.
E. Art as a Special Category
One special consideration in the Barnes Foundation litigation is a
particular public interest in the preservation of its priceless art and
cultural assets. Despite a long and vigorous history of private property
rights, recent jurisprudence has allowed increasing regulation of
property for environmental preservation, 
'
11 land use management,20 1
and historic conservation. '2  Regulation of art held in private hands,
like the Barnes Foundation, might help to maintain, and even en-
hance, the public interest in the objects' preservation, security, and
even public accessibility. Art, like historic buildings or environmen-
tally sensitive land, has sufficient impact on the public welfare to allow
the state to invoke its police powers of regulation. The U.S. Supreme
Court allowed Grand Central Station to be declared a historic build-
ing in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, recognizing that
private property can be regulated "to enhance the quality of life by
generally to cases where "the amount of principal or complexity of duties imposed
upon the trustee makes continuance of the trust impractical." 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 6110 official cmt. 1982.
Bylaws, supra note 13, at art. IX, para. 11.
201) See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (2002) (requiring
compensation for environmental regulation only if there is no remaining economically
viable use of the land).
201 See, e.g., Viii. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389-97 (1926) (up-
holding zoning laws, despite the seventy-five percent decrease in land Ise value, as
within the state's police powers, and ruling the laws did not constitute a taking within
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
202 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (al-
lowing GIand Central Station to be declared a historic site and permitting restrictions
on the use of its airspace as a result); United Artist's Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of
Phila., 635 A.2d 612, 620-21 (Pa. 1993) (holding that the designation of a Philadelphia
movie theater as a historic monument was not a taking Under either the United States
or Pennsylvania Constitution, and thus did not require compensation).
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preserving the character and desirable aesthetic features of a city";
203
the parties did not even "contest that... preserving structures and ar-
eas with special historic, architectural, or cultural significance is an
entirely permissible governmental goal. 2 1
Massachusetts and California have already passed statutes that
protect art from destruction . The Massachusetts Art Preservation
Act primarily protects the artist's moral right not to have his artwork
destroyed or damaged during his lifetime, rather than preserving fine
art for the public's sake.2 ' Both the Massachusetts and California
statutes recognize the "public interest in preserving the integrity of
cultural and artistic creations. 2 7 The California Art Preservation Act
grants a right of action to individual artists during their lifetimes,18
but it also allows a nonprofit artistic institution to bring an action for
injunctive relief to protect "fine art" from "defacement, mutilation,
alteration, or destruction" after the artist's death.2 The art must be
both of "recognized quality" (a court-determined inquiry based on
expert opinions of curators, collectors, dealers, and artists) and "of
substantial public interest.,
21 0
The case involving the Dream Garden mosaic demonstrates how art
could be regulated not only to prevent outright destruction but also to
regulate public access and the location of objects of cultural and artis-
tic value. The Dream Garden is a beautiful glass mosaic, designed by
Tiffany Studios, and housed in the lobby of the Curtis Publishing
Building in Philadelphia; it was owned by John W. Merriam until his
211death in 1994.. In April 1998, a sale and removal of the mosaic was
under negotiation; the sale was revealed to the Philadelphia press on
July 22, 1998 . Only one week later, the Philadelphia Historical
Commission sent notice of its intent to designate the Dream Garden as
2013 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 129.
2114 Id.
2015 See Nicole B. Wilkes, Public Reponsibilities of Private Owners of Cultural Property:
Towvard a National Art Preservation Statute, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L & ARTS 177, 188-91
(2001) (outlining the provisions and the controversy surrounding their adoption).
206 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85S(a) (Law. Co-op. 2000); see also Wilkes, supra
note 205, at 190 (noting that only artists have a right of action to sue for the preserva-
tion of their own art).
207 CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(a) (West 2001); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 231, § 85S(a).
208 CAL. Ctv. CODE § 987(e).
2(19 [. §§ 987(c), 989(c).
210 Id. §§ 989(b)(1), 987(t).
21 Estate of John W. Merriam v. Phila. Historical Comm'n, 777 A.2d 1212, 1215
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).
212 d.
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a historic object, preventing removal from its current location in the
Curtis Publishing Building.!" Philadelphia law allows regulation of
objects of "functional, aesthetic, cultural, historic or scientific value
that may be, by nature or design, movable yet related to a specific set-
ting or environment. 2 "'  The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas
initially denied judicial review of the Dream Garden's administrative
designation as a historic object, and the sale was not permitted.2 l ' Fur-
ther challenge to the administrative designation may succeed on the
grounds that the Commission followed improper procedure; it should
not undermine the facial validity of the code.'
A similar state statute might enable Pennsylvania to better control
the conditions under which the state's artistic treasures are housed.
Although the court ordered that the Dream Garden was to remain in its
current location, the Merriam estate case stands for the principle of
public regulation of art to ensure public access. If Pennsylvania were
to adopt a similar law, the state might use it to allow the Barnes Foun-
dation to accept the Pew/Lenfest offer in the name of artistic preser-
vation. Clearly, a large percentage of the works in the Barnes collec-
tion would qualify as state treasures; the only question would concern
the outer boundary of permissible state regulation.
Legislation limiting the private uses of art should be tempered by
the fact that it might discourage individuals from becoming patrons
for fear that their property will be regulated away from them. A fur-
ther concern would be that lack of private patronage would actually
decrease the quality and quantity of new artistic creation. Any regula-
tion, therefore, should remain mindful of the incentives for private
collectors to buy and commission art.
While public regulation of privately held art should be carefully
crafted, takings jurisprudence has demonstrated that such regulation
is constitutionally within the state's police powers. Public policy may
show that regulation of artistic creations is necessary to ensure that ob-
21:1 Id.
21-4 PHILA., PA., CODE § 14-2007(2) (1) (1998).
2 i' Estate ofJohn W. Merriam, 777 A.2d at 1214. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Com-
monwealth Court held that the administrative determination was eligible for judicial
review and remanded. Id. at 1216-17.
216 SeeJohn Nivala, Presevation Is Process: 'he Designaion of Dream Garden as a His-
toric Object, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 237, 243-44 (2002) (arguing that while the Pennsyl-
vania Commonwealth Court entertained a facial challenge to the code based on a tak-
ings analysis, "Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent offered little, if any, support fo0r
such a challenge").
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jects of cultural and artistic value are properly maintained, securely
housed, and accessible to the public.
CONCLUSION
The current status of charitable trust law does not adequately ac-
count for the public welfare at the inception of the trust, in the re-
quired fiduciary duties of trustees, when modifying trusts, nor in con-
sidering trust failure. Charitable trusts receive enormous benefits
from the public, justified by the public nature of the trust itself. The
law does not require any proportionality between the benefits-tax
exemption, existence in perpetuity, and public enforcement-and ac-
tual service to the public. Instead, the law focuses almost entirely on
the enforcement of donor intent and donor-specified purposes. As
long as the trust purposes fall into one of six broad categories, 2 7 all
the benefits of classification as a charitable trust will accrue.
The current Barnes Foundation litigation highlights these prob-
lems. Albert C. Barnes's idiosyncratic beliefs and dictations live with
us to this day, regardless of the resulting detriment to the public. A
world-class collection remains shrouded by restrictive trust terms, with
access limited to mere hundreds of people per week, when millions
clamored to view the art on its one-time tour. Meanwhile, the collec-
tion has benefited from huge tax breaks, ongoing enforcement of
trust terms, and use of the judicial system and the office of the Attor-
ney General for enforcement of each of the Barnes indenture's provi-
sions. Now the Foundation, the City of Philadelphia, and the public
have a unique and unprecedented opportunity to open the collection
and free it from unreasonable restraints. Under current law, however,
it is unclear whether the court will allow such a significant departure
from Barnes's original terms.
This Comment has discussed five ways that the public interest can
be incorporated into the administration of charitable trusts like the
Barnes Foundation. Through statutory reform and changes in the
public policy regarding charitable trusts, perhaps the public will dis-
place donors as the true beneficiary of charity in America.
217 See supra text accompanying notes 41-43 (outlining the categories of permissi-
ble charitable trust purposes set out in the Restatement of Trusts).
